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Logic and Methodology, Center Stage*
Anita Burdman Feferman
Solomon Feferman
The ﬁrst international Congress for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy
of Science was held at Stanford University in August of 1960. Occupying the
vacuum created by the demise of the Unity of Science movement, it was the
culminating event, on an international scale, of a long process of reorganization
of communities of the philosophy of science and of logic that took place in the
ﬁfteen years following World War II—a process that involved many competing
interests and personalities. Alfred Tarski was the pre-eminent winner in that
competition, for the organization of the Stanford congress and its many suc-
cessors to come was stamped with his view of logic and methodology as being
at the center of systematic scientiﬁc thought.
After the Unity of Science Movement
Emigration, death, politics, and philosophical conﬂict account for the failure
of the Unity of Science movement to maintain its position at the core of the
international organization in logic and philosophy of science. The leading
ﬁgures who were still alive had long since dispersed, mostly to America, as
part of the general intellectual and cultural ﬂight from Nazism in Germany
and Austria in the 1930s. In the United States, an eﬀort was made to continue
the movement through the ﬁfth International Unity of Science Congress at
Harvard in 1939 and the sixth, in Chicago, two years later. That meeting,
held three months before the United States entered the war against Germany,
Italy, and Japan, proved to be the last. Quine’s joking characterization of
the Harvard congress as “the Vienna Circle in international exile, with some
accretions” applied to the Chicago conference, too.
The Vienna Circle had already disintegrated in the mid-1930s after Hans
Hahn died and Moritz Schlick was murdered by a deranged student on the
steps of the University of Vienna. Otto Neurath, the main energizer and pro-
moter of the Unity of Science movement and a noted socialist, ﬂed to the
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Netherlands when the Austrian fascists came into power. After the Nazi inva-
sion of Holland, Neurath managed to make his way to England but died of a
heart attack in 1945.2 The mantle of leadership could have passed to Carnap,
who had gone to Chicago well before the war. He was the foremost practi-
tioner of the Circle’s doctrine of logical positivism, but he was not a dynamic
leader. What was needed was someone with Neurath’s personality: endlessly
enthusiastic and enterprising, with the determination to see his projects into
existence. There wasn’t any one like him around, at least not in the Unity of
Science group.
In addition to the personal losses, the movement in exile in the United
States was absorbed in a less programmatic and more diﬀuse development
of the philosophy of science, partly due to critiques of its basic tenets—most
trenchantly by Quine—and partly due to new inﬂuences. In particular, it had
to relate to an American philosophical tradition of empirical philosophy stem-
ming from the pragmatism of Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John
Dewey that originated in the latter days of the nineteenth century. Though
this school of thought also granted empirical science a privileged position in
the unfolding of human knowledge, it did not make as sharp a distinction as
the logical positivists had done between “meaningful”, directly veriﬁable state-
ments and “meaningless”, metaphysical statements. Another diﬀerence was
that the pragmatists did not give the new developments in mathematical logic
a central position. The leading postwar representative of the American tradi-
tion in the philosophy of science was Dewey’s student Ernest Nagel, the John
Dewey Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University.
There was also a signiﬁcant political dimension to the movement’s decline,
connected with a major change in perspective. In addition to its program of
cleansing philosophy of unreason, logical empiricism had also been in the busi-
ness of social enlightenment, and its leaders, especially Neurath and Carnap,
had allied themselves with socialist causes. When the ﬁrst representatives of
the movement came to the United States before the war, they were welcomed
to the milieu of leftist intellectuals centered in New York. But after the war
(in the view of the scholar George Reisch), “the movement died because its
method, values and goals were broadly sympathetic to socialism at a time
when America and its colleges and universities were being scrubbed clean of
red or pink elements. The apolitical logical empiricism of the 1950s . . . was
a new-born child of the cold war.”3 Like many others, Carnap was subject
to political pressures during the McCarthyite red-scare period of the 1950s.
When Carnap moved to UCLA in 1954, the FBI—which had been investigat-
ing Philipp Frank as an alleged promoter of communism in the United States
on the basis of an unfounded rumor—began compiling a ﬁle on Carnap, too.
They found frequent occurrences of his name in issues of the American Com-
munist Party newspaper, the Daily Worker, in support of humanitarian and
2. Cf. [Feigl 1969] and [Dahms 1993].
3. [Reisch (n.d.)].
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internationalist causes, especially for peace. Carnap may not have been in-
vestigated directly, but many of his friends and colleagues were questioned.
Earlier, Sidney Hook, another prominent student of Dewey’s and a fervent
anti-communist, had vehemently warned Carnap against being tagged as a
communist sympathizer. On the occasion of Carnap’s publicly signing plans
for a meeting of the Cultural and Scientiﬁc Congress for World Peace, an al-
leged communist-front organization, Hook wrote Carnap that “anybody who is
still a sponsor by the time the party-line begins to sound oﬀ at the Congress,
will be marked for life as a captive or fellow traveler of the Communist Party.”4
Whatever the exact balance of forces were that led to the decline of the
Unity of Science movement, its exhaustion as such was widely recognized.
Seizing the opportunity, Tarski and his colleagues eagerly stepped into the
void. The organizational task that they faced at the outset was to bring
American and European logicians and philosophers of science together in an
umbrella organization that would do for those ﬁelds what the Unity of Science
movement had done in the interwar period, but now in a way devoted solely
to “objective” issues, without subscribing to the comprehensive scientiﬁc world
view promoted by the movement in the 1930s that had included the rational
transformation of society.
Organizational Jockeying5
In Western Europe soon after the end of World War II, a number of new
societies for logic and philosophy of science came into existence, both as na-
tional and as international organizations. Most prominent among the latter
was the International Union for the Philosophy of Science (IUPS), founded in
1950 by Ferdinand Gonseth, a mathematician in Zurich. Since the late 1920s
Gonseth had been developing an approach to the foundations of mathematics
and the philosophy of science in terms of an “open,” dialectical philosophy
that rejected the possibility of absolute foundations. Despite the handicap of
severely impaired eyesight and the burden of teaching elementary courses at
his university, he wrote proliﬁcally, expounding his views, and in the 1930s
he organized discussion meetings called the “Entretiens de Zürich”; later, with
colleagues, he launched a new journal, Dialectica. Gonseth became president
of the IUPS, which subsumed various societies of logic and philosophy of sci-
ence that had arisen in Western Europe in the previous years. Though his
union was broadly representative in composition, there were complaints that
Gonseth ran it in a high-handed way.6
Meanwhile, Tarski was generating interest within the Association for Sym-
bolic Logic (ASL) for the formation of a broader international organization
4. Letter of Hook to Carnap, 29 March 1949, reproduced in part by [Reisch (idib.)].
5. Evert W. Beth Archives, Amsterdam; cf. also [van Ulsen 2000].
6. [Pilet 1977], and H. Guggenheimer letter to [Solomon Feferman], 9 September
2001.
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for logic and the philosophy of science. Though the association itself was oﬃ-
cially international and had many active foreign members, its center of gravity
was in the United States and it was largely regarded as being American. In
pushing to ally the ASL more broadly, Tarski and his colleagues hoped to put
it in a better position to garner ﬁnancial support for conferences, journals,
publications, and other activities. Not surprisingly, Gonseth’s group was also
in pursuit of the same beneﬁts. At that time, an expected source of funding
for both was the United Nations Educational, Scientiﬁc, and Cultural Orga-
nization. However, UNESCO could not be approached directly; there was a
hierarchy under it, branching along two main lines: the International Council
of Scientiﬁc Unions and the International Council for Philosophy and Human-
istic Studies. The Association for Symbolic Logic was already placed under the
former through the International Mathematical Union, but that limited the
types of conferences and activities it could pursue and did not represent the
interests of its membership among the philosophical logicians and philosophers
of science.
Gonseth’s society was included under the philosophical branch of UN-
ESCO, but Gonseth wanted desperately to be allied with the scientiﬁc branch;
toward this end, in the early 1950s he courted the ASL to join forces in or-
der to take advantage of the logic group’s recognized strength and prestige.
Tarski’s Dutch colleague Evert Beth belonged both to the logic association
and to Gonseth’s group and was thus a natural go-between. The problem
was that he, Tarski, and others in the association were put oﬀ by Gonseth’s
authoritarian way of conducting matters and by his lack of logical rigor. For
that reason, Tarski and Beth discouraged the proposed alliance. Gonseth then
tried to get his organization into the International Council of Scientiﬁc Unions
(ICSU) on its own, but—as a result of behind-the-scenes maneuvering by Fa-
ther Bocheński on behalf of the ASL—that too was quashed. However, the
ICSU made a counterproposal: entry would be approved if Gonseth’s Interna-
tional Union for the Philosophy of Science would join with the International
Union for the History of Science, which was already under its aegis. The histo-
rians of science were not at all happy with this proposal; but the decision had
already been made higher up, and they were told that they would not continue
to receive support from ICSU unless their union joined with the philosophers
of science in this way. At the same time, power was wrested from Gonseth as
president of his own organization. In 1953 a putsch by Beth and his friends
took place: the Dutch logician Arend Heyting was made president; the po-
sition of vice-president was taken over by Tarski’s friend, the philosopher of
physics Jean-Louis Destouches; and Evert Beth assumed the role of secretary.
Tarski vs. Gonseth re Methodology
In 1953, Gonseth gave a lecture at the Colloque International de Logique in
Brussels. Tarski attacked him head-on during the discussion period, brutally
dismissing his ideas:
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I must admit that I do not see, in the exposition of Professor
Gonseth, one single problem which could be treated and settled
by rational methods. When I hear, for instance, that there is an
essential diﬀerence between mathematics and the natural sciences,
my ﬁrst tendency is to resist this opinion . . . whether it concerns
the origin of the disciplines involved, or the methods of inquiry
applied in them, or perhaps the methods of organizing and es-
tablishing the results obtained; also under what conditions the
diﬀerences can be called essential. Finally, I arrive at the con-
clusion that as long as these points are not clariﬁed, no serious
discussion of the problem is possible.7 [emphasis in original]
In response to another participant in the same discussion, Tarski went on
to remark:
It would be more than desirable to have concrete examples of
scientiﬁc theories (from the realm of the natural sciences) orga-
nized into deductive systems. Without such examples there is
always the danger that the methodological investigation of these
theories will, so to speak, hang in the air. Unfortunately, very
few examples are known which would meet the standards of the
present-day conception of deductive method and would be ripe
for methodological investigations; I can refer, however, to some
recent attempts in this direction—to the work of J.H.Woodger in
the foundations of biology and of J. C.C.McKinsey and his group
in the foundations of physics. The development of metamathe-
matics, that is, the methodology of mathematics, would hardly
have been possible if various branches of mathematics had not
previously been organized into deductive systems.8
In other words, a precondition for the methodological study of the sciences
would, in Tarski’s view, be their presentation as axiomatic deductive systems,
and the paradigm for that was the axiomatization of various parts of math-
ematics and its study by the methods of metamathematics. All of this was
directly opposed to Gonseth’s anti-foundational, open view of science.
For many years Tarski and Carnap had held the ideal view that the sciences
ought to be systematized in axiomatic deductive form. As the philosopher
of science Michael Friedman puts it, Carnap—in his famous 1934 work The
Logical Syntax of Language—had articulated the program of logical analysis
as the principal enterprise of philosophy, “simply as a branch of logical syntax:
speciﬁcally [that] of the language of science.”9 But Tarski had not always been
as sanguine about its applicability. However, by the time of his criticism of
7. [Tarski 1986a, Vol. 4, p. 715–716].
8. Ibid.
9. [Friedman 1999, p. 12].
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Gonseth in 1953 he could, at least, point to the work on axiomatization of
physics by McKinsey and Suppes and the group around them.
Even so, Tarski remained equivocal about the role of logic in the method-
ology of the physical and other sciences. In the preface to the proceedings
of the 1957 Berkeley conference on the axiomatic method in geometry and
physics, he wrote (with his co-editors Henkin and Suppes) that “much foun-
dational work in physics is still of the programmatic sort, and it is possible to
maintain that the status of axiomatic investigations in physics is not yet past
the preliminary stage of philosophical doubt as to its purpose and usefulness.
In spite of such doubts, an increasing eﬀort is being made to apply axiomatic
methods in physics.”10 Tarski was not the only one to speak of mathematical
and scientiﬁc methodology, and the use of “methodology” as a key word for
the kinds of research programs he had in mind does not originate with him;
it goes back to the Polish philosopher Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, though Tarski
perhaps construed it in more speciﬁc terms along the lines of Carnap’s project
for the logical investigation of scientiﬁc language and theories as formal ob-
jects of study. The word “methodology” has a ponderous sound to some ears,
and its intended scope is not clear; but, since it was Tarski who emblazoned it
as the emblem on his shield, the recurrence of the word in the organizational
activities that he promoted is unavoidable. It had already become part of the
name of the interdepartmental program in logic and the methodology of sci-
ence that Tarski and his colleagues inaugurated at Berkeley in 1957. (In recent
years, “methodology” has become a vogue word, often misused as a pretentious
substitute for “method” in scientiﬁc and technical contexts.)11
A Marriage of Convenience
Following the directive of the International Council of Scientiﬁc Unions, in 1955
the international societies of the historians of science and of the philosophers
of science joined to create a new entity, the International Union for the History
and Philosophy of Science (IUHPS) under the ICSU umbrella. The parties to
this marriage of convenience took care to demarcate themselves, respectively,
as the Division of History of Science and the Division of Logic, Methodology
and Philosophy of Science (DLMPS) within the new union. With the removal
of Gonseth, the Association for Symbolic Logic had joined the IUPS the year
before and was now represented with signiﬁcant voting power in the new di-
vision for logic and methodology. At the same time, it managed to retain its
place under the International Mathematical Union, thus enjoying the best of
both worlds.
Between the years 1955 and 1960, the presidential position of the new
DLMPS rotated between Alfred Tarski; Jean Piveteau, a paleontologist from
10. [Henkin, Suppes, & Tarski 1959].
11. See the usage note for “methodology” in the American Heritage Dictionary,
4th ed., Houghton-Miﬄin, Boston, 2000.
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the Sorbonne in Paris; Robert Feys, a Belgian philosopher of logic; and Arnold
Schmidt, a German logician. Tarski’s friends Jean-Louis Destouches and Ev-
ert Beth were appointed secretary and treasurer/ adjoint secretary, respec-
tively. Still, Gonseth was not totally out of the picture; over Tarski’s objec-
tion, Gonseth’s backers saw to it that he was given the title of “Honorary
President”. In 1960 the terms of oﬃcers were lengthened to four years each,
with Stephen Kleene becoming president for 1960-1963, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz
vice-president, Patrick Suppes secretary-general, and the Dutch mathemati-
cian Hans Freudenthal treasurer and adjoint secretary, putting Tarski’s people
ﬁrmly in the saddle. To start things oﬀ with a big bang, a major congress was
proposed for Stanford in 1960.
The 1960 Congress
A grand idea in breadth and depth, the congress planned for Stanford in
1960 was almost derailed. Patrick Suppes, secretary-general designate of the
division and the leading philosopher of science at Stanford, was the point
man. In 1959, late in the planning stages, he told Tarski that he was having
diﬃculty raising funds and was under pressure from the National Research
Council and the National Science Foundation to abandon the idea of a separate
international congress of the division and instead join the historians of science
in their eﬀorts to organize an international congress at a later date in the
United States but not necessarily at Stanford.
Outraged at the proposal, Tarski wrote Suppes:
My reaction to the idea of holding an international congress jointly
with the historians of science is decidedly negative . . . A congress
for the whole IUHPS [International Union for the History and Phi-
losophy of Science] would be a gathering of people with very few
common scientiﬁc interests uniting for some administrative, and
not scientiﬁc, reasons. In particular, logicians would be engulfed
in a sea of men who have entirely diﬀerent approaches in their re-
search and who apply entirely diﬀerent methods, and I do not see
what logicians could gain by participating in such a congress.12
Tarski wanted to stick with the Stanford plans for territorial reasons, too.
“The work of our group in the San Francisco Bay Area [will give] a guarantee of
a high scientiﬁc level for the proposed congress . . . [and] if we join the historians
of science in their eﬀorts, the common congress will be held somewhere in the
East.” (Long gone was Tarski’s feeling that the West Coast was intellectually
inferior.)
Tarski prevailed in his opposition to a joint meeting, and the National
Science Foundation, along with the American Council Learned Societies, was
12. Tarski letter to Patrick Suppes, October 1959; Tarski Archives.
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persuaded at the last minute to help fund the 1960 congress at Stanford.
Ironically, in the end, no ﬁnancial support for this or succeeding meetings
of the division was obtained from UNESCO, but its titular support gave the
organization the desired international status.
The breadth of the congress was assured by the composition of the orga-
nizing committee, which was headed by Ernest Nagel as chairman and Alfred
Tarski as vice-chairman and included leading scholars from biology, economics,
logic, mathematics, philosophy, physics, and statistics. The plans for the meet-
ing were ambitious in their scope and set a pattern that has largely been fol-
lowed in succeeding congresses of the DLMPS. Invited lectures and contributed
papers were distributed through eleven sections, the ﬁrst three of which were
designated for Mathematical Logic, Foundations of Mathematical Theories,
and Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics. The next two were entitled: Gen-
eral Problems of Methodology and Philosophy of Science; and Foundations of
Probability and Induction. Following that were four sections on the Methodol-
ogy and Philosophy of Biological and Psychological Sciences, Social Sciences,
Linguistics, and Historical Sciences. The ﬁnal section was labeled History of
Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science.13
Despite the wide scope, more than a third of the invited lectures were in
the ﬁrst three sections. Thus the “Logic” of “Logic, Methodology and Phi-
losophy of Science” was placed front and center—in contrast to the prewar
Unity of Science meetings, where it had a secondary position. The ﬁrst three
sections of the Stanford congress had among its invited speakers, such nota-
bles as Stephen Kleene, Abraham Robinson, Paul Bernays, Alonzo Church,
Arend Heyting, Georg Kreisel, and Tarski himself, as well as a number of
Tarski’s students and co-workers. But while logic now took pride of place,
methodology and philosophy of science commanded the major portion of the
program. As in the Unity of Science meetings from 1935 to 1941, this was con-
strued broadly to include the physical, biological, and social sciences.14 Lead-
ers in the latter ﬁeld among the invited speakers were the economists John
Harsanyi and Leonid Hurwicz, the psychologist Ernest Hilgard, the social sci-
entist Paul Lazarsfeld, and the linguist Noam Chomsky. Other distinguished
participants were the philosophers Karl Popper and Rudolf Carnap and the
physicists Henry Margenau and John Wheeler. Berkeley and Stanford were
well represented, as Tarski foresaw, yet the meeting was by no means insular;
participants came from all over the world, including several from countries
behind the Iron Curtain.
The list of speakers and disciplines generated palpable excitement; new per-
sonal contacts were made and new interdisciplinary sparks generated. These
were enhanced by the many dinners and parties that were arranged informally
as well as by several group excursions that were organized for the weekend.
13. The full program is to be found in [Nagel, Suppes, & Tarski 1962].
14. The programs of the Unity of Science meetings 1935-1941 are given in full in
[Stadler 1997, p. 406–436].
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“This country is so beautiful”
It was remarked that, at every opportunity during the Stanford congress, the
Soviets and others from communist countries jumped into any group posed
for a photograph and threw their arms around the most prominent Americans
present. The “opportunists” explained quite frankly that they feared they were
on a “hit list” back home and hoped that such evidence could be used as a
form of protection to show that they were known in the West; Józef Bocheński
was sure he was “number ten” in Poland.15 Another concern for participants
from Iron Curtain countries was that the U.S. State Department had set a
limit of a ﬁfty-mile radius from San Francisco beyond which they were not
allowed to go. (This was a tit-for-tat response to similar restrictions on the
movement of Westerners in the Soviet Union.) A special tour to the Monterey
Peninsula had been planned for one of the free days of the congress, including
stops at the old Carmel Mission and Point Lobos State Park on the Paciﬁc
Ocean. Since the farthest point to be reached was nearly a hundred miles
south of Stanford, special permission was obtained to extend the allowed radius
temporarily. Two tour buses were hired and ﬁlled to capacity. At Point Lobos,
with its spectacular scenery of craggy cliﬀs covered by windswept monterey
pines and twisted cypress, paths are well-marked and there are strict warnings
not to wander beyond their limits. But at the most famous Cypress Point, the
excited scholar-tourists broke the rules and scrambled all over to see the view
and take photos. When it was time to regroup and get on the buses for the
return to Stanford, all the Russians were missing. After a long wait, ad hoc
search parties and a ranger were sent out to scour the various paths and call
out for them, to no avail. Now the tour leaders began to worry: Could one
or more of the Russians have hidden so as to escape those of their company
suspected to be KGB agents, or were they themselves agents? Worse yet, could
one of them have fallen oﬀ the edge of a cliﬀ to injury or death? Finally, after
an interminable wait, one by one the Russians appeared as if out of nowhere,
with hardly a word of explanation or apology except to say: “It’s your fault!
This country is so beautiful, we could not resist taking one photograph after
another and it was impossible to stop.”
After 1960, the LMPS congresses continued to meet every four years,
with an occasional exception. They were held in Jerusalem, Amsterdam,
Bucharest, London (Ontario), Hanover, Salzburg, Moscow, Uppsala, Florence,
and Cracow. In August 2003, the ﬁrst congress of the twenty-ﬁrst century
took place in Oviedo, Spain. Tarski’s stamp on the organization and its
meetings is indelible, and even during his lifetime he was gratiﬁed with the
success of his vision.
15. Nino Cocchiarella interview with [Anita Burdman Feferman] and [Solomon
Feferman], April 2000.
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